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Consider the following story: 1  An employee contacts an
attorney after she is fired from her job; the employee believes that
she has been terminated because of her gender and race. After
conducting a preliminary investigation, her attorney files a complaint
alleging wrongful discharge against the client's former employer in
federal district court. The district court warns plaintiff's counsel that
several of the statements made in the complaint are inflammatory.
Defendant's counsel sends a warning letter demanding that plaintiff
dismiss the complaint and threatening to seek sanctions.
After initial discovery fails to reveal sufficient facts to sustain
plaintiff's claim, plaintiff dismisses her complaint. Following
dismissal, defendant immediately files a motion for sanctions
alleging that plaintiff's claims were frivolous. But defendant only
seeks sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent
power. In a separate letter to the court that is copied to plaintiffs
* Associate Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law,
B.A. (History & Economics) Whitman College, 1988; J.D., William S.
Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii, 1992; LL.M., Harvard Law
School, 1998. I would like to thank Southwestern University School of Law
for its generous financial support of this project; my colleagues, Katherine C.
Sheehan, Dennis Yokoyama, Franklin Ferguson, Jr., Michael Dorff, and
Austen Parrish for providing insightful comments and suggestions; and my
research assistant, Kristin M. Schuh, for all of her help in compiling the cases
for this article. I would also be remiss if I did not thank Professor Georgene
Vairo for inviting me to participate in this Symposium and the editors of the
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for all of their work editing this article.
1. This story is a hypothetical composite of various cases collected for this
article. It does not recount the actual conduct of any particular parties.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 37:645
counsel, however, defendant suggests that the district court should
sua sponte sanction plaintiff under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The district court declines defendant's invitation to sanction
plaintiff's counsel under Rule 11. The court specifically notes that
defendant failed to comply with Rule I1 's procedural requirements;
it also notes that this may be the reason prompting defendant's
§ 1927 and inherent power motion. Because the court also cannot
find bad faith by plaintiffs counsel in filing the complaint, it
declines to impose sanctions under either § 1927 or its inherent
power.
The foregoing story illustrates both a positive and negative
effect created by the 1993 amendments to Rule 11. The positive
effect-the court denies Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff for failure
of defense counsel to comply with the procedural amendments added
to the Rule in 1993. One could therefore argue that the amendments
appear to be doing their job. But the negative effect--defendant now
requests 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and inherent power sanctions specifically
because defendant either cannot, or simply did not, satisfy those very
same procedural amendments added to Rule 11 in 1993.2 In
addition, the defendant sometimes still requests Rule 11 sanctions,
notwithstanding the failure of compliance.3 Are the amendments still
working when sanctions other than Rule 11 are requested, because of
the 1993 amendments? Are they working when Rule 11 sanctions
are still threatened? Unfortunately, the story recounted above,
though just a hypothetical, is a scenario that is currently being played
out in the federal district courts.
This article examines the interaction of Rule 11 vis-a-vis 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power to sanction.
Incidentally, this paper was prompted by research uncovered for
another article,4 indicating that: (a) while Rule 11 use appears to be
2. This is a negative effect because rather than avoiding sanctions entirely
for failure to comply with Rule I l's procedural requirements, sanctions under
alternative bases of sanctioning authority are still threatened.
3. Significantly, Rule 11 sanctions, even in the face of noncompliance
with the procedural amendments, are not always denied. See Danielle Kie
Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the 1993
Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2002) [hereinafter Hart, Still Chilling].
4. See Id.
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declining in the federal courts after the 1993 amendments to the
Rule, imposition of sanctions under § 1927 and the court's inherent
power may be increasing;5 and (b) the federal courts and the litigants
appearing before them seem to be using 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and/or the
court's inherent power to sanction to circumvent the procedural
requirements of Rule 11 when those procedural requirements have
not been or could not be met.
6
Since then, subsequent research on this subject appears to
support both of these observations. The purpose of this paper,
therefore, is to tie these two observations together and to explore the
implication(s) they pose for civil rights plaintiffs in the federal
courts. Very briefly, the fear is that: (1) unlike the judge in the
hypothetical recounted above, the federal district courts will
misapply Rule 11 but will nevertheless use their sanctioning
authority broadly to improperly impose sanctions when such
sanctions could not be imposed under Rule 11; or (2) even if the
federal district courts do not make these mistakes, civil rights
plaintiffs will not file meritorious lawsuits in the federal courts
because of the potential that the courts will use their sanctioning
authority broadly.
Part II examines the federal district court's sanctioning
authority. Part II.A briefly examines the history, scope and purpose
of Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power to
sanction, taking care to note the significant overlap between the three
sanctioning provisions. Part II.B then explores why Rule 11 was
amended in 1993, focusing mainly on the Rule's chilling effects.
According to many commentators, the mere threat of Rule 11
sanctions, coupled with the knowledge that large Rule 11 sanctions
are sometimes imposed, chilled creative advocacy by discouraging
civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys from filing meritorious
claims in the federal courts. Studies also showed that Rule 11 was
used disproportionately against civil rights plaintiffs. 7 Part II.B
5. Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 589,
643 (1998) [hereinafter Vairo, Profession].
6. See infra Part mI.
7. See infra Part 11.B; see also Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at 12-17
(discussing the findings of numerous studies, most of which concluded that
civil rights plaintiffs were sanctioned at a substantially higher rate than other
plaintiffs).
647
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA WREVIEW [Vol. 37:645
discusses some of the specific amendments designed to help reduce
these effects. Part I.B underscores the inherent difficulty that exists
in trying to reduce one sanctioning rule's adverse effects when the
federal courts have other, somewhat overlapping, sanctioning
authority available to them. That problem, more specifically, is that
the federal courts and the litigants appearing before them may well
start to rely more heavily on other bases of sanctioning authority if it
has become more difficult to obtain sanctions under Rule 11.
Part III lays out the research collected for this article, which
tends to confirm, at least very preliminarily, that the sanctions
problem identified in Part 11 actually seems to exist in the federal
courts. Part IV discusses in greater detail the general and particular
implications of this preliminary conclusion. Briefly, using
alternative bases of sanctions to circumvent the procedural
requirements of Rule 11 eviscerates the 1993 amendments and
creates a zero sum sanctions game for federal court litigants. The
more particular result is that the 1993 amendments are not reducing
Rule 11's chilling effects. Instead, they are arguably spreading to
include 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power to sanction.
Even though all federal court litigants may be adversely affected by
what appears to be a sanctioning trend in the federal courts, the
category of litigants most likely to be chilled are civil rights
plaintiffs.
Part V poses other relevant considerations that are significant to
this discussion. Specifically, Part V.A explores the propriety of
circumventing the procedural requirements of Rule 11 by using 28
U.S.C. § 1927 or the court's inherent power to sanction. This
question is especially cogent in light of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,8 which is briefly
discussed. Part V.A ultimately concludes that it is improper to use
§ 1927 or the court's inherent power to sanction to displace Rule 11
simply because the Rule's procedural requirements are not satisfied:
(a) where the specific mechanisms for triggering sanctions under
§ 1927 or the court's inherent power are not independently met; and
(b) as a matter of policy. The Chambers case should not be
interpreted as compelling a different result. Finally, Part V.B
discusses what is at stake when 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's
8. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
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inherent power to sanction are used as Rule 11 substitutes. In a
nutshell, using these alternative bases of sanctions as Rule 11
substitutes will increase the chilling effects experienced by civil
rights plaintiffs in the federal courts. The result is to threaten access
to the federal courts for these types of litigants bringing these types
of claims.
II. THE FEDERAL COURT'S SANCTIONING AUTHORITY
A. Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Court's Inherent
Power to Sanction
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has existed
since 1938; it has generated hundreds of cases and countless law
review articles. Since it was originally enacted in 1938, the Rule has
been substantially amended twice. The original version was
designed to "promote honesty in pleading" 9 but was seldom used,
because the Rule's bad faith requirement was too difficult to prove. 1
The second version, as amended in 1983, was designed to give the
federal district courts greater authority to control litigation." Its
9. Karen Kessler Cain, Frivolous Litigation, Discretionary Sanctioning
and a Safe Harbor: The 1993 Revision of Rule 11, 43 U. KAN. L. REv. 207,
207-09 (1994).
10. Id. at 209; see also Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis,
118 F.R.D. 189, 191 (1988) (noting that the 1938 version of Rule 11 was
largely ignored.); James R. Simpson, Why Change Rule 11? Ramifications of
the 1992 Amendment Proposal, 29 CAL. W. L. REv. 495, 496 (1993) (The
reason "the rule was rarely invoked during its first 45 years prior to the 1983
amendment" was "[d]ue to the difficulty in proving subjective bad faith");
Howard A. Cutler, A Practioner's Guide to the 1993 Amendment to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 67 TEMP. L. REv. 265, 273 (1994) (noting that
Rule 11 was "rarely invoked" because the showing of subjective bad faith was
"very difficult and time-consuming"); FED. R Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
note to 1983 amendment (acknowledging that "in practice Rule 11 has not
been effective in deterring abuses") (citation omitted); Lawrence C. Marshall
et al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REv. 943, 947 (1992)
(concluding that the practical effect of the bad faith requirement "was to place
only 'a moral obligation on attorneys to satisfy themselves that good grounds
existed for the action or defense"') (footnote omitted).
11. Eric K. Yamamoto, Case Management and the Hawaii Courts: The
Evolving Role of the Managerial Judge in Civil Litigation, 9 U. HAW. L. REv.
395, 430 (1987); Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure
Reform in Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 675, 679 (1997).
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primary purpose was to deter frivolous lawsuits, 12 and it was, and
continues to be, very successful in getting attorneys to "'stop, look
and inquire"' before filing. 13  The result is that parties assert or
litigate fewer meritless positions, and they bring less groundless
litigation in the federal district courts. 14 But the 1983 version of the
Rule was probably invoked too often and created several significant
problems, including excessive Rule 11 litigation and diminished
access to the federal courts by litigants asserting non-mainstream
claims.' 5 The current version of Rule 11, as amended in 1993, was
specifically designed to address those problems.16
The primary purpose of Rule 11, however, remains deterrence,
not compensation. 17 Consequently, if a Rule I 1 violation is found,
the federal district courts are admonished to impose the least severe
sanction "sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable
conduct by others similarly situated.'
8
12. Cutler, supra note 10 at 273; Cain, supra note 9 at 207; FED. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment.
13. Eric K. Yamamoto & Danielle K. Hart, Rule 11 and State Courts:
Panacea or Pandora's Box?, 13 U. HAW. L. REv. 57, 60-61 (1991) (quoting
Erik K. Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for
Minorities, 25 HARV. C.R. -C.L. L. REv. 341, 362 (1990)).
14. Id.; c.f Carl Tobias, Rule 11 and Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L.
REv. 485, 513-14 (1988/1989) (noting that the 1983 version of Rule 11
increased the federal bench and bar's awareness of Rule 11 and, significantly,
caused attorneys to stop and think before filing, deterred some frivolous
litigation, and, as a result, helped ameliorate the primary problem that
prompted the 1983 amendment, namely, the deterrence of abuse.) (footnotes
omitted) [hereinafter Tobias, Litigation]; Marshall, supra note 10, at 964
(Lawyers practicing in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits were asked in a
study conducted by the American Judicature Society, "'what is the biggest
impact, if any, of the sanctioning provisions of Rule 11 on your practice?' The
leading response, which was quite consistent with the intent of the framers of
Rule 11, was that Rule 11 has generated increased factual investigation before
the filing of cases and pleadings.") (footnote omitted).
15. Yamamoto & Hart, supra note 13, at 60-61; Georgene M. Vairo, Rule
11: Where We Are and Where We Are Going, 60 FoRDHAM L. REv. 475, 480
(1991) [hereinafter, Vairo, Where We Are]; Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at
10.
16. See infra Part H.B.
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment
("[T]he purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter rather than to
compensate .. ").
18. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 1(c)(2); see also GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS:
THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE §§ 16(C)(1)-(2) at 287 (3d ed.
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Rule 11 scrutiny is tri ered when a party or its attorney signs1 9
and presents to the court "a pleading, written motion, or other
paper."2' By signing and presenting the pleading, motion or other
paper to the court, the party or attorney certifies:
(1) that the paper is not interposed for any improper
purpose; (2) that the presenter has conducted a reasonable
inquiry into the law and that the paper embodies existing
legal principles or a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and (3)
that the presenter has conducted a reasonable inquiry into
the allegations, contentions and denials of fact contained in
the pleading, written motion or other paper.
22
Hence, Rule 11 is expressly limited to misconduct involving
pleadings, written motions and other papers. It does not extend to
any other kind of litigation misconduct.23 In contrast, the district
court's authority to sanction under either 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or its
inherent power is not so limited.24
Section 1927 has been in existence since 1813.25 It was
originally enacted "to prevent multiplicity of suits or processes,
where a single suit or process might suffice."26 The statute was
amended in 1980 to specifically provide for an award of attorneys'
fees; it now provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in
any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who
2000) [hereinafter JOSEPH, SANCTIONS]; see also FED. R. CIV. P. I1 (b)(1)-(4).
19. Rule 11 requires that each pleading, motion or other paper be signed by
at least one attorney of record or the party. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (a).
20. Presenting includes "signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating." Id.
11(b).
21. Id.
22. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 6(D), at 119; see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 1 l(b)(1)-(4).
23. Gregory P. Joseph, Sanctions: Rules 11, 26(g), 30(d), and 37, § 1927,
Inherent Power, Appellate Rule 38, and § 1912, in CIVIL PRACTICE AND
LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 79, 91 (ALI-ABA
Course of Study, Dec. 9, 1999), WL SE63 ALI-ABA 79 [hereinafter Joseph,
Rules].
24. Id.
25. See generally, JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 20, at 374
(discussing § 1927's legislative history in more detail).
26. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 (1980) (citation
omitted).
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so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
27
Section 1927 is a penal statute, the primary purpose of which is
to deter unnecessary delay in litigation by requiring attorneys in
violation of the statute to personally satisfy the excess costs,
including attorneys' fees, attributable to their litigation misconduct. 8
The statute "penalizes the wrongful proliferation and prolongation of
litigation. 2 9 Section 1927, therefore, is a specific attempt to address
the problem of controlling abuses of judicial processes. The statute
"'imposes an obligation on attorneys throughout the entire litigation
to avoid dilatory tactics."' 31 Thus, unlike Rule 11 sanctions, which
focus on pleadings, written motions and other papers, "the inquiry
under § 1927 is on a course of conduct."
32
To trigger sanctions under § 1927, the lawyer's conduct "must
multiply the proceedings both 'unreasonably and vexatiously."'
33
That is, a federal district court may only impose sanctions pursuant
to § 1927 "if[:] (1) the actions of the attorney multiply the
proceedings and (2) the attorney's actions are [both] vexatious and
unreasonable." 34 The power granted to the federal district courts to
sanction pursuant to § 1927 is one that must be strictly construed.35
It is also one which should be utilized only in situations "evidencing
a 'serious and standard disregard for the orderly process of
justice. ,,
36
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000).
28. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 20, at 374-75.
29. Id., § 23(A)(1), at 384.
30. Roadway Express, Inc., 447 U.S. at 761-62.
31. Bowler v. U.S. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 901 F. Supp. 597,
604 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, AFL-
CIO, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir. 1991)).
32. Id. at 605 (citation omitted).
33. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 23(B)(1), at 395 (emphasis
added); see also id, § 23(B), at 395 (for a general discussion of "unreasonably
and vexatiously").
34. Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 768 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th
Cir. 1985) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id. (quoting Kietel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1167
(7th Cir. 1968)).
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The federal circuits are split as to whether § 1927 requires a
showing of subjective bad faith or whether mere recklessness is
sufficient. 37  Nevertheless, given the standard triggering liability
under § 1927, the scope of sanctionable misconduct under the statute
is broader than Rule 11. In other words, more types of misconduct
are sanctionable under § 1927 than Rule 11.38 Indeed:
It is important to bear in mind.., that "unreasonably"
modifies "multiplies the proceedings"-that is, the issue is
not necessarily the reasonableness of the position asserted
but rather whether the assertion itself is, in the
circumstances, reasonable. Therefore, the fact that Rule 11
sanctions may be denied with respect to a court filing does
not necessarily mean that the filing does not contravene §
1927.39
Importantly, the scope of sanctionable conduct under Rule 11
and § 1927 also overlaps. For example, both Rule 11 and § 1927
would apply to the following situations occurring within a pending
case: "[fliling a baseless or deceptive pleading[;] [fliling a baseless
motion[;] [filing] baseless opposition papers in response to a
motion[;] [p]ursuing [or later advocating] a litigation position after it
becomes apparent that the asserted position is devoid of merit[; and]
[t]aking frivolous legal positions[.]" 40
The federal district court's sanctioning power, however, is not
limited to what is enumerated in statutes or in the rules of civil
procedure.41 The federal courts have the inherent power to punish
37. Gregory P. Joseph, Recent Sanctions Decisions: Rule 11, Inherent
Power, 28 US.C. § 1927, in CIVIL PRACTICE AND LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN
FEDERAL AND STATES COURTS 23, 33 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Jan. 15-
17, 2003), WL SH063 ALI-ABA 23.
38. See generally JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 21, at 375, § 23, at
384.
39. Id. §23(B)(1), at 395 (emphasis added).
40. Id. §23(A)(1), at 384-85 (discussing § 1927) "There is no question that
the wrongful multiplication of proceedings within a pending case is
sanctionable under § 1927.") (citations omitted); see also supra text
accompanying notes 19-23 (discussing when Rule 11 applies and what triggers
Rule 11 scrutiny).
41. C.f JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 26(A)(1), at 427. Indeed,
Rule 11 and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 simply "represent partial codifications of a
courts' [sic] inherent power to sanction." S.D. Shuler, Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc.: Moving Beyond Rule 11 Into the Uncharted Territory of Courts Inherent
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attorneys or parties who abuse the judicial process, 42 including the
power to sanction. 3 The court's general inherent power is one that
the federal courts have long upheld; indeed its existence has been
recognized since the early Nineteenth Century."4
The inherent power to impose sanctions is generally included
amongst "those powers necessary to the exercise of all others."4
5
This power is not governed by specific rules or statutes, "but by the
control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as
to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."46 The
inherent power to impose sanctions, therefore, is generally
acknowledged as being necessary "to protect against the disruption
or abuse of judicial processes and to ensure obedience to a court's
orders, thereby preserving [the court's] authority and dignity.
' 4 7
Although it has been said that the court's inherent power to
sanction serves the three purposes of deterrence, compensation and
punishment, with an emphasis on the latter two,48 the primary
purpose of this power appears to be "the improvement of the judicial
process." 49  Consequently, inherent power sanctions may only be
imposed for abusive litigation practices undertaken in bad faith.50
Unlike § 1927, therefore, where there is a split in the circuits,51 bad
Power to Sanction, 66 TUL. L. REV. 591, 596 (1991).
42. Vairo, Profession, supra note 5, at 594.
43. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991); Shuler, supra
note 41, at 596.
44. Shuler, supra note 41, at 596; see also Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821) (Implicit in Article III of the federal constitution,
which creates the Supreme Court and confers power on Congress to establish a
federal judiciary, is the power of courts to "impose silence, respect, and
decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates.").
45. Joseph, Rules, supra note 23, at 174; see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The
Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA
L. REV. 735, 742 (2001).
46. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (citation omitted).
47. Pushaw, supra note 45, at 764-65 (footnote omitted).
48. Thomas E. Baker, The Inherent Power to Impose Sanctions: How a
Federal Judge Is Like an 800-Pound Gorilla, 14 REV. LITIG. 195, 201 (1994);
Daniel H. Fehderau, Rule 11 and the Court's Inherent Power to Shift
Attorney's Fees: An Analysis of Their Competing Objectives and Applications,
33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 701, 705-06 (1993).
49. Fehderau, supra note 48, at 705.
50. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 26(A)(1), at 427 (citation
omitted).
51. See supra text accompanying note 37.
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faith is an absolute requirement to trigger sanctions under the court's
inherent power.52
The court's inherent power to sanction is therefore narrower
than Rule 11 because of the bad faith requirement. 53 It is also much
broader than the Rule (and § 1927 for that matter) because of the
scope of the court's inherent power, 4 which has been described as
"unlimited,",5 5 and "staggeringly broad., 56  The court's inherent
power to sanction covers the full range of litigation abuse,57 not just
misconduct associated with pleadings, written motions and other
papers (Rule 11),58 or litigation misconduct that unreasonably and
vexatiously multiplies the proceedings (§ 1927).' 9 In fact, the court's
inherent power to sanction is broad enough to reach misconduct that
does not even occur before the court.6° But, "[b]ecause inherent
powers are shielded from direct democratic controls," 61 the federal
courts are admonished to exercise their inherent powers "with
restraint and discretion."
62
Like § 1927, there is also considerable overlap between Rule 11
and the court's inherent power to sanction, especially with respect to
litigation misconduct failing Rule 1 's improper purpose
63certification. More specifically, the "improper motive andharassment prohibited by Rule 11 are similar to the kind of [bad
52. See generally JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 27(A), at 446 ("A
finding of bad faith on the part of the offender is a prerequisite to the
imposition of an inherent power sanction."); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501
U.S. 32, 45-46 (1991) (A court's inherent power to sanction is limited to when
a party acted fraudulently or in bad faith.).
53. Fehderau, supra note 48, at 718; Baker, supra note 48, at 199.
54. Baker, supra note 48, at 199-200.
55. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
56. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 2(E), at 44.
57. Fehderau, supra note 48, at 718.
58. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 28-36.
60. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 26(E)(1), at 437 ("The sanction,
however, is limited to bad faith related to the litigation process, and it does not
extend to unrelated misconduct, such as prelitigation bad faith misbehavior that
is encompassed within the cause of action.").
61. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980); Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991).
62. Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764.
63. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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faith] conduct addressed by" the court's inherent power. 64
B. The 1993 Amendments to Rule 11
Notwithstanding that the federal courts have a plethora of
sanctioning provisions at their disposal,65 Rule 11 is probably one of
the most well-known and one of the most controversial.66 It was
substantially amended in 1993 to address the problems created by the
1983 version of the Rule,67 the most problematic of which was its
chilling effects on civil rights plaintiffs and other litigants asserting
non-mainstream claims in the federal courts.6 8 Very briefly:
[Rule lI's] chilling effects essentially took two distinct but
related forms. First, Rule 11 stifled the development of the
common law by "inhibit[ing] vigorous and creative
lawyering," thereby chilling creative advocacy. More
specifically, because of the threat of Rule 11 sanctions,
lawyers were much less likely to file some novel but
meritorious claims that they might otherwise have pursued
and/or to make novel legal arguments that may well have
prevailed in court. Second, Rule 11 had a disproportionate
impact on certain types of litigants and their attorneys; the
threat of sanctions "pose[d] special threats to small
plaintiffs' attorneys and to public interest and pro bono
attorneys, thereby inhibiting court access for certain social
groups, especially those asserting novel legal theories or
64. Fehderau, supra note 48, at 718.
65. See, e.g., Chambers, 501 U.S. at 61-62 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing
a non-exhaustive list).
66. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV.
855, 857 (1992); Developments in the Law-Lawyers' Responsibilities to the
Courts: The 1993 Amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 107
HARv. L. REv. 1629, 1630 (1994) [hereinafter Developments in the Law].
67. Another major problem created by the 1983 version of Rule 11 included
excessive satellite.litigation. Carl Tobias, The 1993 Revision of Federal Rule
11, 70 IND. L.J. 171, 172 (1994) [hereinafter Tobias, Revision]; see generally,
Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at 10-17 (discussing various problems that
the 1983 version created, including: excessive Rule 11 litigation, increased
adversariness, disproportionate impact on certain parties and plaintiffs, and
stifling of creative lawyering).
68. See generally Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at 6-17 (discussing the
chilling effects on civil rights claims and asserting that it is the most troubling
problem caused by the 1983 version of the Rule).
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reordered social understandings in the form of legal
rights."
69
Several, sometimes related, causes appear to have been
responsible for the Rule's chilling effects. These causes included,
among other things, a lack of uniform sanctioning procedures, use of
Rule 11 by the federal district courts as a fee-shifting device and,
many commentators believed, a substantive bias in the federal courts
against civil rights plaintiffs.7 °
To reduce Rule I l's chilling effects, the Advisory Committee
incorporated a couple of major substantive changes into the Rule.71
While these substantive changes are significant, "the Advisory
Committee appears . . to have relied [mainly] on procedure to
mitigate the Rule's chilling effects. 72 Only the procedural changes
most relevant to this paper are discussed below.
73
69. Id. at 11 (footnotes omitted).
70. Id. at 18.
71. First, to reduce the Rule's negative impact on the assertion of novel
claims, Rule I l's "good faith" standard was replaced by a "nonfiivolous"
standard. See FED. R. CIv. P. 1 l(b)(2) (1993); Hart, Still Chilling, supra note
3, at 25; Cain, supra note 9, at 219; Simpson, supra note 10, at 505. Second,
to reduce the Rule's disproportionate impact on plaintiffs asserting claims in
federal court, Rule 11 was amended to allow plaintiffs to make factual
allegations "likely to have evidentiary support" without being in violation of
the Rule. See FED. R. CIv. P. 1 l(b)(3). Plaintiffs, in other words, may now file
their claims in federal court with less factual information, especially in
situations where relevant information is possessed by the defendant or third
parties. See Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at 26; Leslie M. Kelleher, The
December 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure - A
Critical Analysis, 12 TOURO L. REV. 7, 64 (1995); Developments in the Law,
supra note 66, at 1646; Scott Nehrbass, The Proposed Amendment to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11: Balancing the Goal of Deterrence with
Considerations of Due Process and Fairness, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 199, 222-23
(1992).
72. Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at 26-27; cf, Sam D. Johnson et al.,
The Proposed Amendments to Rule 11: Urgent Problems and Suggested
Solutions, 43 BAYLOR L. REV. 647, 663-64 (1991) (asserting that "[tjhe most
salient change .. .is a thorough reorganization of Rule 11 ... designed to
improve the procedures by which sanctions are imposed" but conceding that
the changes are insufficient to combat the potential abuse of the Rule); William
W. Schwarzer, Rule 11: Entering A New Era, 28 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 7, 19
(1994) (characterizing the new procedure for Rule 11 as the "most drastic" of
the 1993 amendments to the Rule).
73. For a more complete discussion of the procedural changes made to Rule
11 in 1993, see Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at 27-34.
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To begin with, the federal district courts are no longer required
to impose sanctions if a violation of Rule 11 is found. Instead, the
decision to impose sanctions is now discretionary.7 4  If the court
decides to impose a sanction, however, it is specifically encouraged
to impose non-monetary sanctions.75 Indeed, attorneys' fees are not
available at all if sanctions are imposed pursuant to a court's order to
show cause.76 A federal district court may only impose monetary
sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees where a party initiated a
motion for Rule 11 sanctions.
77
The 1993 amendments also dramatically changed Rule 11
motion practice by making it procedurally more difficult to obtain.
For example, there is now a separate motion requirement, meaning
that any request for Rule 11 sanctions cannot simply be included in
another motion, like a motion to dismiss, but rather must be made
independently. 78  In addition, a party moving for sanctions must
serve its Rule 11 motion on the opposing party twenty-one days, or
such other time as the court may prescribe, prior to filing it with the
court.79  Procedurally, therefore, Rule 11 sanctions can only be
awarded pursuant to a party's motion if both the separate motion
requirement and safe harbor provision have been complied with. 80
Stated alternatively, a party's Rule 11 motion must be denied by the
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (c).
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory
committee's note to 1993 amendment (noting that a sanction may be
nonmonetary as well as monetary and the various limits on monetary
sanctions).
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 1(c)(2) ("Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs
(A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a
nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on
motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing payment to
the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys'fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation.") (emphasis added).
77. Id,
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
79. Id. My colleague, Franklin Ferguson, Jr., points out that Local Rules of
Court often address filing deadlines and, consequently, could impact
significantly on Rule 11 practice and analysis in a given jurisdiction. While
certainly important, the impact that such Local Rules may have on the 1993
amendments and Rule 11 interpretation are beyond the scope of this article.
80. Whether Rule 11 sanctions are imposed assumes that a Rule 11
violation is found and that the offending pleading, written motion or other
paper was not withdrawn or amended appropriately within the safe harbor
period.
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federal district court if that party either fails to make a separate Rule
11 motion or fails to serve the motion on the opposing party twenty-
one days prior to filing it in court. If the federal district court decides
to impose Rule 11 sanctions, however, the court is now explicitly
required to issue an order that describes the conduct violating the
Rule and explains the basis for the Rule 11 sanction imposed. 81
The procedural changes made to Rule 11 in 1993, therefore,
were an attempt by the Advisory Committee to: (1) provide uniform
sanctioning procedures, thereby providing uniformity to the federal
district courts' sanctioning decisions; 82 (2) prevent Rule 11 from
being used as a fee-shifting device by explicitly limiting the use of
attorneys' fees as the most widely used "appropriate" sanction for a
Rule 11 violation;83 and (3) limit the arbitrary imposition of Rule 11
sanctions, i.e., because of any substantive bias, by requiring the
federal district courts to explain the bases of their Rule 11
decisions.
84
As previously discussed, however, Rule 11 is certainly not the
only provision in the federal court's sanctioning arsenal.85 The
court's inherent power to sanction and 28 U.S.C. § 1927 have been
around for a long time.86  Indeed, whether or not Rule 11 was
amended in 1993 to help reduce some of the Rule's chilling effects,
these other sanctioning authorities were available and were used by
the federal courts. They would be available even if Rule 11 were to
be repealed tomorrow.
87
So, what is the problem? The problem is not so much that the
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (c)(3).
82. See Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at 35.
83. Id. at 35-36.
84. Id. at 37.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 25-64 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1927
and the court's inherent power) and supra note 65 and accompanying text
(discussing other sanctioning authority).
86. See supra text accompanying notes 25, 44.
87. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment
("Rule 11 is not the exclusive source for control of improper presentations of
claims, defenses, or contentions. It does not supplant statutes permitting
awards of attorney's fees to prevailing parties or alter the principles governing
such awards. It does not inhibit the court in punishing for contempt, in
exercising its inherent powers, or in imposing sanctions, awarding expenses, or
directing remedial action authorized under other rules or under 28 U.S.C. §
1927.") (citation omitted).
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federal courts have sanctioning authority other than Rule 11. Rather,
the fear is that the federal district courts and attorneys will resort to
other sanctioning tools, including 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 and the court's
inherent power, to sidestep Rule 11 because the procedural
requirements added by the 1993 amendments make it harder to
obtain Rule 11 sanctions. Whether this problem actually exists in the
federal district courts is examined in the next part.
III. SANCTIONS PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
If the federal district courts and federal litigators are using 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power to sanction to get
around amended Rule 11, then one should expect to find two things
in the case law: first, raw data that Rule 11 use is declining
subsequent to the 1993 amendments, while reliance on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 and the court's inherent power is increasing over the same
time period;88 and second, evidence in the cases themselves
demonstrating that these alternative bases of sanctions are actually
being relied upon for the specific purpose of sidestepping the
procedural requirements of the amended Rule. There seems to be
preliminary support for both propositions in the cases.
In 1998, Professor Georgene Vairo observed anecdotally that:
Rule 11 has been replaced by an increased emphasis on
other sanctions tools, such as 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the
court's inherent power. Now that the consciousness of the
bench and bar regarding the need for sanctions in egregious
cases has been raised, these tools appear to be used with
much greater frequency than before Rule 11 was amended
in 1983.89
This comment prompted me to test the accuracy of the claim. To
88. It is very important to distinguish between increased reliance on these
alternative bases of sanctions and an increase in sanctions imposed pursuant to
them. The research conducted here only tracked the former. That is, no
attempt was made to determine whether more sanctions are actually being
imposed under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power after the 1993
amendments to Rule 11. Instead, my only concern was to determine whether
28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power to sanction were being
invoked in the federal district courts at a greater rate since the 1993
amendments.
89. Vairo, Profession, supra note 5, at 643.
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do so, it was necessary to compare numbers for all three sanctioning
provisions both before and after the 1993 amendments to Rule 11.
Two five year periods were thus selected9" and searches were run on
Lexis-Nexis 91 in the following four federal district courts: the
Southern District of New York, the District of New Jersey, the
Eastern District of Louisiana, and the Northern District of
California.92 The numerical results are set forth in Table 1 below.
93
TABLE 1: FREQUENCY OF USE TABLE
1/1/86-12/31/91 1/1/96-12/31/01
RULE 11 § 1927/IP Rule 11 §1927/1P
SDNY 731 121 389 199
DNJ 81 4 48 32
EDLa 89 9 83 33
NDCal 68 12 65 20
90. The two five-year periods are: January 1, 1986 - December 31, 1991
(covering the 1983 version of Rule 11), and January 1, 1996 - December 31,
2001 (covering the 1993 version of the Rule).
91. The following searches were run in each of the four federal district
courts selected for the two five year time periods selected: (1) Southern
District of New York ("federal rule of civil procedure 11" or "frcp 11" or "fed.
r. civ. p. 11" or "rule 11" /p sanction AND COURT (southern); "28 USC
1927" or "28 U.S.C. § 1927" or "inherent power" /p sanction AND COURT
(southern)); (2) District of New Jersey ("federal rule of civil procedure 11" or
"frcp 11" or "fed. r. civ. p. 11" or "rule 11" /p sanction; "28 USC 1927" or "28
U.S.C. § 1927" or "inherent power" /p sanction) (3) Eastern District of
Louisiana (federal rule of civil procedure 11" or "frcp 11" or "fed. r. civ. p. 11"
or "rule 11" /p sanction AND COURT (eastern); "28 USC 1927" or "28 U.S.C.
§ 1927" or "inherent power" /p sanction AND COURT (eastern)); and (4)
Northern District of California ("federal rule of civil procedure 11" or "frcp
11" or "fed. r. civ. p. 11" or "rule 11" /p sanction AND COURT (northern);
"28 USC 1927" or "28 U.S.C. § 1927" or "inherent power" /p sanction AND
COURT (northern)).
92. Each of these district courts was selected for the following reason: these
were the district courts in which I uncovered cases indicating that 28 U.S.C. §
1927 and the court's inherent power to sanction were being used to sidestep
Rule 1 's procedural requirements. I therefore wanted to check the frequency
of sanctions in these districts.
93. The size of the case law sample collected for this article is not large
enough to generate statistically significant results. The numbers are included
nevertheless because they suggest certain trends in the sanctioning practices of
the federal district courts selected.
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Professor Vairo's anecdotal observation turned out to be quite
accurate. The raw numbers available on Lexis-Nexis 94 revealed that
Rule 11 use in every district examined had in fact declined and that
28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power were invoked more
frequently since the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 went into effect.
95
Preliminary research, therefore, suggests that the first part of the
sanctions problem identified in Part II may exist in the federal district
courts. The next step, of course, is to determine why Rule 11 use in
the federal district courts is declining while use of § 1927 and the
court's inherent power is increasing.
I should disclose up front that I did not analyze each and every
case cited in the empirical research compiled in Table 1. Nor do all
of the cases discussed actually impose sanctions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and/or the court's inherent power.96 All of the cases
that I discuss below, however, strongly suggest that these alternative
bases of sanctions were requested and/or are at issue because of a
failure to comply, either as a tactical decision or inadvertently, with
94. It is very important to note that the raw numbers reflected in Table 1
most likely do not represent all of the sanctions activity in any of the federal
district courts examined. Experience with Rule 11 has shown that a majority
of Rule 11 cases are not reported, either in the form of published opinions or
even on the electronic databases, like Lexis-Nexis and Westlaw. See Mark
Spiegel, The Rule 11 Studies and Civil Rights Cases: An Inquiry into the
Neutrality of Procedural Rules, 32 CoNN. L. REv. 155, 169 n.62 (1999)
(identifying a study done in the Third Circuit finding "only 9.1% of the Rule
11 cases that were disposed of resulted in opinions published in the reporter
system and only 39.1% of the total dispositions were on Lexis or Westlaw"
(citation omitted)); Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look At Amended Rule 11, 48
AM. U. L. REv. 1007, 1042-43 (1999) (noting that reported Rule 11 court
cases are not necessarily an accurate reflection of the Rule's operation because,
for a variety of reasons, many cases don't appear in published services).
Therefore, it seems safe to assume that a majority of the § 1927 and inherent
power activity would similarly go unreported.
95. My colleague, Franklin Ferguson, Jr., first notes that sanctions overall
decreased in both the Southern District of New York and the District of New
Jersey, while sanctions overall rose slightly in both the Eastern District of
Louisiana and the Northern District of California; he then asks whether these
numbers are important. Unfortunately, determining the significance of these
"trends," assuming that they continued to hold up over time and in a
statistically significant sample of cases, is beyond the scope of this paper.
96. See supra note 88.
Winter 2004] CIVIL RIGHTS PLAINTIFFS BEWARE
Rule 11 's procedural requirements.
97
In Farris v. County of Camden,98 for example, plaintiff, the
lessor of office space to the county, sued the county, its employees
and the chairman of the local political committee, alleging, among
other things, that the defendants conspired to punish him for failing
to make political contributions.99 Approximately fourteen months
later, defendant chairman and defendant political committee moved
for sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees against plaintiff's
counsel l °
The bases of defendants' motion for sanctions were that
plaintiff's counsel: "asserted claims against them which counsel
knew or should have known lacked an arguable basis in law and
fact"101 and "'intentionally advance[d] ... baseless contention[s]
for an ulterior purpose, such as harassment or delay[. '
Defendants, however, only requested sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 and the court's inherent power, not Rule 11, a fact that the
district court found "curious,"' 3 since the crux of the alleged
misconduct fell within the scope of the Rule. 10
While there is some suggestion in the opinion that the
defendants put plaintiff's counsel on "notice" that they planned to
seek sanctions of some kind, defense counsel made no attempt to
comply with Rule 1 's procedural requirements, 0 5 as defendants'
97. The subsequent history for the cases compiled in Table 1 was not
checked, because the purpose of collecting these data was simply to test a
hypothesis-namely, to determine whether Rule 11 use decreased in the
federal courts over the same time period in which reliance on 28 U.S.C. §
1927 and the court's inherent power increased. Consequently, I was merely
interested in the raw numbers. Whether any of the cases were ultimately
modified or even reversed on appeal, therefore, really has no impact on the
hypothesis being tested.
98. 61 F. Supp. 2d 307 (D.N.J. 1999).
99. Id. at 318-19.
100. Id. at319.
101. Id. at331.
102. Id. at 332 (quoting Defendant's Brief in Support of Motion for
Sanctions (filed Dec. 8 1998) at 17).
103. Id. at 331.
104. Id. at 334.
105. Defendants alleged that they put plaintiff's counsel on notice that they
would be seeking sanctions several months prior to filing their motion. While
the exact type of "notice" provided is not specified, it was clearly insufficient
to satisfy Rule lI 's motion requirements. The court addressed the issue at
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motion was filed directly with the court. 0 6  Defense counsel,
however, requested in a letter to the district court that the court sua
sponte sanction plaintiff's counsel, pursuant to Rule 1 I(c)(1)(B).
117
The federal district court in Farris ultimately denied defendants'
motion for § 1927 and inherent power sanctions, because defense
counsel failed to establish that plaintiffs counsel acted in bad
faith.'0 8  The court also declined to impose sua sponte Rule 11
sanctions, because doing so "would allow [defense counsel] to
circumvent the 'safe harbor' requirement of the Rule."
09
Similarly, in Malbrough v. Kilpatrick & Stocktown, LLC," °
plaintiffs' filed a complaint against several defendants alleging
various Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)
claims.' l Plaintiffs' counsel was twice warned by the federal
district court that certain allegations made in the complaint exposed
her to sanctions if they turned out to be frivolous."12 Shortly after the
court's initial warning, plaintiffs dismissed their RICO complaint.
Defendants then moved for sanctions.
113
length in a footnote. See id. at 332 n.15.
106. Id. at 332. Recall that Rule 11 requires that a motion requesting
sanctions be served on the opposing party twenty-one days prior to being filed
with the court. See FED. R. Civ. P. I I(c)(1)(B); see also supra text
accompanying notes 79-80.
107. Farris v. County of Camden, 61 F. Supp. 2d 307, 332 (D.N.J. 1999).
Two brief points should be made concerning defense counsel's request for sua
sponte Rule 11 sanctions. First, defendants were seeking attorneys' fees as a
sanction, which, pursuant to the plain language of Rule 11, cannot be awarded
if Rule 11 sanctions are imposed sua sponte by the district court. FED. R. Civ.
P. 1(c)(2); see also supra text accompanying notes 76-77. Second, and
unfortunately, it is not uncommon for federal court litigants and/or the federal
district court itself to use Rule I l's order to show cause procedure to sidestep
Rule lI's motion requirements. See Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, Parts
Ill.A.2.c & IlI.B.4.a.
108. Farris, 61 F.Supp.2d at 335.
109. Id. at 334. For another case out of the New Jersey district court, see In
re Prudential Insurance Co. of America Sales Practices Litigation, 63 F. Supp.
2d 516, 523 (D.N.J. 1999) (A magistrate judge explicitly found that attorney
for class members who objected to a class settlement filed a 28 U.S.C. § 1927
motion against lead class counsel in an "attempt[] to sidestep the 21-day safe
harbor provision under Rule 11;" the district court judge concluded, among
other things, that counsel's § 1927 motion was itself filed in bad faith.).
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Significantly, the defendants moved for sanctions pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1927, rather than Rule 11, a fact that the district court
specifically noted. 1 4  The district court found, moreover, that
"plaintiffs conduct in [the] case was more akin to a Rule 11 type
violation than § 1927" because the alleged misconduct involved a
pleading. 1 5 The court speculated that defendants may have sought
sanctions pursuant to § 1927, specifically because they failed to
comply with the procedural requirements of amended Rule 11. The
court stated:
A motion for Rule 11 sanctions... may not be filed with
the court unless it is first served on the allegedly offending
party and twenty-one days have passed without the pleading
or motion being withdrawn .... No such notice/safe harbor
is required under § 1927. The defendants do not purport to
have complied with the notice procedures of Rule 11;
hence, perhaps, their resort to [28 U.S.C. § 1927].116
The district court denied defendants' motion, because plaintiffs
had withdrawn their complaint after being warned by the court,
which, coincidentally, was within twenty-one days after it was
filed."
l 7
In Chatham Partners, Inc. v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of
Maryland,"' plaintiff filed an order to show cause seeking an order
requiring defendant to pay approximately $4.5 million allegedly due
114. Id.
115. Id. at *2.
116. Id. at*1.
117. Id. at*2.
118. No. 99 Civ. 12308, 2001 WL 1262960 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2001). See
also Suarez v. Gallo Wine Distributors LLC, No. 02 Civ. 4273, 2003 WL
716548 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2003); Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Bradlees,
Inc., No. 99 Civ. 4677, 2002 WL 1967032 (S.D.N.Y. June 4, 2002); Duferco
Int'l Steel Trading v. T. Klaveness Shipping A/S, 184 F. Supp. 2d 271
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10175,
2001 WL 1154669 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2001); Yrityspankki Skop Oyj v. Delta
Funding Corp., No. 98 Civ. 7888, 2001 WL 477009 (S.D.N.Y. May 7, 2001);
Gamla Enters. N. Am. v. Lunor-Brillen Design U. Vertriebs GmbH, No. 98
Civ. 992, 2000 WL 193120 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2000); Schlaifer Nance & Co.
v. Warhol, 7 F. Supp. 2d 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Some of the cases listed here
are clearly more recent than the cases compiled in Table 1. They are included,
however, because they: (a) tend to demonstrate that the practice of
circumventing Rule 11 is occurring in the Southern District of New York; and
(b) show that this practice is still ongoing.
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and owing on a surety bond. 19 The district court determined that
plaintiff's claims with respect to the surety bond were meritless and
its order to show cause was frivolous' 20 The court therefore
concluded that "some sanction [was] appropriate and the only
question [was] the amount." Defendant moved for sanctions, but
only pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.121 The district court explained
the defendant's strategy as follows: "Apparently recognizing that its
failure to serve a Rule 11 notice would preclude the court from
awarding it attorneys' fees under that Rule, defendant has not sought
them under Rule 11 but rather asks for such relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927. ''I22 The district court agreed that plaintiff's counsel violated
§ 1927 by filing the unwarranted order to show cause and awarded
defendant $9,017.00 in attorneys' fees.
123
These apparent attempts to sidestep the procedural requirements
of amended Rule 11 are not limited to the attorneys litigating in
federal court. The federal district courts themselves sometimes
initiate the practice.
For example, in Galonsky v. Williams,124 defendant moved for
Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff's counsel for filing frivolous




123. Id. at *2. The district court apparently believed that both Rule 11 and
§ 1927 were implicated by plaintiff's filing the complaint and its order to show
cause. Rule 11 sanctions were not available with respect to any of the alleged
misconduct, however, because of defendant's failure to comply with the Rule's
procedural requirements. The district court also declined to impose § 1927
sanctions against plaintiff's counsel for filing the complaint in the case,
because "given the policy considerations that gave rise to the adoption of Rule
I l's safe harbor provision, it seems inappropriate to use 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to
do what the Court cannot do under Rule I 1." Id. (citation omitted). But
because the district court concluded that Rule I l's safe harbor provision could
not have been satisfied with respect to plaintiff's order to show cause-there
was only a five-day response time for defendant-§ 1927 sanctions were
appropriate with respect to that order. Id. The district court's interpretation of
Rule I l's safe harbor provision and plaintiff's order to show cause is very
problematic because such an interpretation effectively writes the safe harbor
provision out of the Rule anytime there is less than twenty-one days to respond
to a pleading, written motion or other paper. See Hart, Still Chilling, supra
note 3; Part IV.B.2.a (rejecting such an interpretation of the safe harbor
provision and discussing solutions).
124. No. 96 Civ. 6207, 1997 WL 759445 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 1997).
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pleadings and a motion to amend the complaint. 125 The district court
concluded that plaintiff's pleadings and motion "were baseless and
unfounded in law" and "filed for an improper purpose," thereby
violating Rule 11.126 Defendant, however, failed to satisfy Rule 1 's
motion requirements, a fact that plaintiff's counsel specifically
pointed out.127 The district court was reluctantly forced to conclude
that defendant's motion "appeared technically barred for failure to
follow the safe harbor provision of Rule 11.,,128 But because the
court was convinced that plaintiffs argument based on Rule 1 's
procedural requirements "exalt[ed] form over function[,]' 29 the
district court gave plaintiffs counsel notice that it was considering
imposing sanctions on its own initiative, pursuant to both Rule 11
and 28 U.S.C. § 1927, where a safe harbor period was not
required. 3 °
The district court ultimately determined that both Rule 11 and
§ 1927 were violated by plaintiffs counsel.13 1 Sanctions in the form
of attorneys' fees, however, were only awarded pursuant to § 1927.
By way of explanation, the district court stated:
Due to the defendant's technical failure to comply with the
safe harbor provision of Rule 11, the Court may not, under
Rule 11, order [plaintiff's counsel] to reimburse the
defendant for attorney fees or other expenses attribut[able]
to his sanctionable conduct. See Rule 1 l(c)(2). Under
§ 1927, however, the Court may properly order such
compensation.
32
Similarly, in Bowler v. US. Immigration & Naturalization
Service,133 the government moved for Rule 1 1 sanctions against
petitioner's counsel for filing an order to show cause to stay a
deportation order, arguing that the action was filed without a






131. Id. at *3-*7.
132. Id. at *7; see also supra Part II.B (discussing the 1993 amendments to
Rule 11).
133. 901 F. Supp. 597 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
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reasonable inquiry into the facts and for an improper purpose.' 34 The
district court "agree[d] with the government that [petitioner's
counsel's] misconduct [fell] within the ambit of Rule 11 [,]" but the
court declined to impose Rule 11 sanctions "because of the
ambiguity of whether [the Rule's] procedural requirements ha[d]
been met .... , On its own initiative, the court then raised the
propriety of sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's
inherent power, despite the fact that neither party had filed briefs
addressing such sanctions.' 36  Petitioner's counsel was ultimately
sanctioned $2,500 in attorneys' fees, pursuant to § 1927.137
Significantly, but not surprisingly, this practice of sidestepping
amended Rule 1 's procedural requirements is also making its way
into federal appellate court opinions. At best, the practice may be
going unnoticed at the appellate level; 138 at worst, the appellate
courts may be encouraging it.
139
134. Id. at 603-04.
135. Id. at 604 (discussing several potential procedural problems).
136. Id. at 605 n.3.
137. Id. at 606. The district court also found that sanctions were appropriate
under the court's inherent power, but the court declined to impose such
sanctions because "the inherent power doctrine should be used with restraint."
Id. at 606 n.5. See Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Warhol, 7 F. Supp. 2d 364
(S.D.N.Y. 1998).
138. See Ted Lapidus, S.A. v. Vann, 112 F.3d 91, 92, 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1997)
(Plaintiff filed a motion for Rule 11 sanctions against defendant for filing an
allegedly improper third party complaint. The Federal District Court for the
Southern District of New York denied Rule 11 sanctions because plaintiff
failed to comply with Rule lI's procedural requirements. Nevertheless, the
court awarded sua sponte sanctions against defendant (who was an attorney),
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 in the amount of $10,000. The Second Circuit
reversed the sanctions order after concluding that defendant did not receive
sufficient notice that sanctions might be based on § 1927. No mention was
made of the apparent use of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to sidestep Rule I1 's procedural
requirements.).
139. Flanagan v. Arnaiz, No. 97-15517, 1999 WL 1128641, at *2 (9th Cir.
Dec. 7, 1999) (the Federal District Court for the Northern District of California
imposed Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff pursuant to defendant's motion,
notwithstanding the fact that Rule lI's safe harbor provision had not been
complied with; the court-not the defendant-apparently gave plaintiff
twenty-one days to withdraw the meritless arguments asserted in plaintiff's
Opposition Memorandum. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order
imposing Rule 11 sanctions and then, citing the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), stated that, "any
technical mistake by the district court was harmless, because it could easily
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It would, of course, be a gross oversimplification to suggest that
the practice of sidestepping Rule 1 's procedural requirements is the
only-or even the main-reason for the decreased reliance on Rule
11 and the increased emphasis on 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's
inherent power to sanction reflected in Table 1. That claim is not
being made here. The pervasiveness of the practice is also unclear
from the preliminary research conducted for this article. Further
research would need to be done before definitive answers could be
reached. At the same time, the cases discussed above do provide one
possible and plausible explanation for at least part of the shifting
reliance on Rule 11 vis-a-vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's
inherent power suggested by the empirical research. 140  More
specifically, Rule 11 use in the federal district courts appears to be
declining at the same time that use of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the
court's inherent power to sanction is increasing at least in part
because the procedural requirements of Rule 11 could no longer be,
or simply were not, met.
IV. AND THE CHILL GOES ON
The research for this article seems to support the hypothesis
articulated in Part II, namely, that the federal district courts and the
attorneys practicing before them may be resorting more frequently to
other sanctioning tools, like 28 U.S.C.A. § 1927 and the court's
inherent power, because it is harder to obtain Rule 11 sanctions after
the 1993 amendments to the Rule. As a result, it appears that Rule
1 I's procedural requirements are being sidestepped in some
percentage of the cases. Significantly, if this conclusion is correct,
then the practice of sidestepping these requirements raises several
troubling implications for federal court litigants in general and
federal civil rights plaintiffs in particular.
Before discussing the implications that "sidestepping" poses, it
have awarded the same sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or its inherent
power.") The Chambers case is discussed further in Part V.A 1, infra.
140. Again, the number of cases collected for this article is not large enough
to generate a statistically significant sample. The research conducted and
conclusions reached here, therefore, are merely preliminary. But the numbers
reflected in Table 1, together with the cases discussed above, do provide
enough information to raise certain issues and discuss their potential
implications.
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is important to understand that this practice describes a couple of
rather specific situations. That is, sidestepping occurs when: (1) the
same litigation misconduct is being used as the factual basis for all'
three sanctions provisions; 141 (2) Rule 1 's procedural requirements
have not been satisfied, and (a) Rule 11 sanctions are threatened
anyway, possibly in conjunction with a threat of alternative bases of
sanctions, and/or (b) because Rule 11 is not satisfied, sanctions are
only sought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent
power.
142
When understood in this fashion, "sidestepping" Rule 1 I's
procedural requirements is problematic, in the first instance, because
it suggests that the safe harbor provision, which was the centerpiece
of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11,143 is not being well-received by
the federal bench and bar. 144 If this suggestion turns out to be
correct-for example, if the safe harbor provision is not being well-
received-this would only provide added incentive to circumvent it.
In addition, or perhaps more specifically, what makes
sidestepping particularly problematic is that such a practice
essentially renders the 1993 amendments to the Rule meaningless.
The district court in Malbrough145 aptly summed up the problem as
141. See infra notes 175, 215.
142. See supra text accompanying notes 124-137, 98-137, respectively.
143. Charles M. Yablon, The Good, The Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An
Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65, 98 (1996); Carl
Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOWA
L. REV. 1775, 1785 n.63 (1992); Sidney Powell & S. Ann Saucer, Revised Rule
11: Is It Safer?, 15 Miss. C. L. REv. 271, 275 (1995); Vairo, Where We Are,
supra note 15, at 498; Georgene M. Vairo, The New Rule 11: Past as
Prologue, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 39, 64 (1994).
144. Perhaps Justice Scalia, in dissenting from the Supreme Court's adoption
of the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including
Rule 11, summed up the opposition to the safe harbor best when he wrote:
In my view, those who file frivolous suits and pleadings should have
no "safe harbor".... Under the revised Rule, parties will be able to
file thoughtless, reckless, and harassing pleadings, secure in the
knowledge that they have nothing to lose: If objection is raised, they
can retreat without penalty .... Even if the careless litigant quickly
dismisses the action, the harm triggering Rule Il's concerns has
already occurred.
61 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4392 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
145. Malbrough v. Kilpatrick & Stocktown, No. CIV.A. 99-1683, 1999 WL
643663 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 1999).
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follows:
At first blush, both 18 [sic] U.S.C. § 1927 and Rule 11
appear to sanction the same sort of conduct. If so, then
arguably a party can circumvent the safe harbor
requirements of Rule 11 by simply filing under § 1927.
Such a rule, however, "would undermine the safe harbor
provision of Rule 11 by essentially reading it out of the
Rule."
1 46
Such an evisceration of Rule Il's procedural requirements, in
turn, creates two different but related problems. The first problem
concerns Rule 11 itself.
The Rule's procedural requirements were added in 1993 to help
accomplish very specific purposes, including reducing the Rule's
chilling effects on civil rights plaintiffs. 147 If these requirements are
being sidestepped in practice (meaning that the requirements are
unfulfilled and Rule 11 sanctions are being requested and perhaps
imposed anyway), the 1993 amendments cannot be accomplishing
their stated objectives. Consequently, Rule I l's chilling effects must
still be continuing in the federal district courts.1
48
In a related and important vein, if Rule Il 's procedural
requirements are being sidestepped (meaning that they are not being
complied with and sanctions are denied under Rule 11, but are being
requested and perhaps imposed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the
court's inherent power because Rule 11 has not been satisfied), then
the chilling effects that prompted the Advisory Committee to amend
Rule 11 in 1993 are arguably spreading to include these alternative
bases of sanctions. The reason for this conclusion, of course, is that
these alternative bases of sanctions are, in effect and to a certain
extent, simply being used as substitutes for Rule 11 requests or
sanctions.
The net effect of sidestepping the procedural requirements of
Rule 11, therefore, appears to be the creation of a potential "zero sum
sanctions game" for all persons appearing in the federal courts. That
is, a federal litigant or her attorney may no longer be sanctioned
146. Id. at * 1 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
147. See supra text accompanying notes 67-84.
148. See generally Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, Part IV (arguing that
Rule I l's chilling effects continue to exist in the federal courts even after the
1993 amendments).
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under Rule 11 because the 1993 amendments make it harder for
courts to award Rule 11 sanctions. But that very litigant or her
attorney may end up being sanctioned under either 28 U.S.C. § 1927
or the court's inherent power, because the 1993 amendments make it
harder for courts to impose Rule 11 sanctions. In either case,
however, sanctions are still threatened and they may still be imposed.
While the zero sum sanctions game may adversely affect all
federal court litigants and attorneys, it is most likely to chill federal
civil rights plaintiffs and the attorneys representing them.'49 Federal
court experience with Rule 11 provides ample evidence explaining
why.
We know, for example, that the impact of Rule 11 on the legal
community is spread in two ways-via Rule 11 decisions handed
down by the federal courts and in the informal Rule 11 activity that
takes place outside of the courts' opinions. 150 A decision to impose
Rule 11 sanctions will have a greater impact on the legal community
than a decision not to sanction. Professor Maureen Armour explains:
[I]n a Rule 11 context, consider two similar cases decided
by different judges with different outcomes; one results in
sanctions, the other doesn't, and both are affirmed on
appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. Neither case
should be treated as anything other than affirming the
court's discretion to act as they [sic] did, and a third judge
facing the problem is free to decide either way. However,
the deterrent impact of the sanction case poses a serious
threat, since in the sanction case law, it will be the adverse
sanctions cases that begin to define the boundaries of Rule
11 and guide a litigant's behavior. Thus, the two cases are
149. See supra text accompanying note 69 (discussing Rule lI's chilling
effects).
150. See Marshall, supra note 10, at 960 ("One of the most significant
questions that needs to be asked about Rule 11 ... is how it has affected
lawyers' practice. For the impact of a sanctions order or threat can extend far
beyond the case in which it is carried out or the lawyers who are directly
affected by it. Lawyers who hear and read about these sanctions must, to some
extent, process the information and shape their own conduct based on their
assessment of the risk that various kinds of conduct they are contemplating
creates. This kind of general deterrence is reflected in litigators' statements
that they have modified their behavior in response to Rule 11.") (emphasis
added).
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not treated equally in the real world ofpractice ... *151
It therefore seems fairly obvious that sizeable Rule 11 sanctions,
in even a few cases,152 would discourage civil rights plaintiffs and
their attorneys from filing lawsuits "because their lack of resources
makes them unusually vulnerable."' 53  Indeed, when the federal
district courts decide to impose Rule 11 sanctions, it is not
uncommon for them to award all litigation costs, including attorneys'
fees, as the "appropriate" Rule 11 sanction. In an article that I
recently wrote, 54 for example, I collected ninety-two district court
cases. 155  In twenty-eight of those cases, Rule 11 sanctions were
imposed, either via motion or order to show cause. Monetary
sanctions in the form of attorneys' fees were imposed in twenty-five
of those twenty-eight cases, or 89% of the time.'5 6  But, more
importantly for present purposes:
[O]ut of the twenty-five cases awarding monetary sanctions
in the form of attorneys' fees, fourteen of them, or 56%,
made just such an award [i.e., awarded all of the litigation
151. Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and the
Conundrum of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493, 566 (1997) (emphasis
added).
152. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 705 F. Supp. 1544, 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1989) ($1
million); Mercury Air Group, Inc. v. Mansour, 267 F.3d 542, 545 (5th Cir.
2001) ($203,641); Harter v. Iowa Grain Co., Nos. 96-3907, 97-2671, 96-4074,
97-2041, 1999 WL 754333, at *2 (7th Cir. July 15, 1998) ($92,000); Cox v.
Preferred Technical Group, Inc., 110 F. Supp. 2d 786, 791 (N.D. Ind. 2000)
($80,917); Kramer v. Tribe, 156 F.R.D. 96, 111 (D.N.J. 1994) ($70,289);
Cooper v. Chicago Transit Auth., No. 95 C 2616, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5299,
at *20 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 14, 1997) ($105,149.78-significantly, the fact that
plaintiffs' attorney belonged to a small firm was held to be insufficient reason
to reduce the size of the award. Id. at *7-8.).
153. Tobias, Litigation, supra note 14, at 501; Hart, Still Chilling, supra note
3, Part IV.A (discussing Rule I I's chilling effects on civil rights cases after the
1993 amendments). It is therefore critical, in looking at Rule 11 vis-a-vis 28
U.S.C. § 1927 or the court's inherent power, to track the number of times
sanctions were actually awarded, the types of cases involved, the relationship
between the type of case and whether sanctions were awarded, and the types of
sanctions that were awarded. This specific research, however, is beyond the
scope of this article.
154. See Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3.
155. While the sample of ninety-two district court cases is not large enough
to generate statistically significant results, the numbers are still important, and
therefore included, because they suggest certain troubling sanctioning trends in
the federal district courts.
156. Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at 98-100.
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costs, including attorneys' fees]. Perhaps more
significantly.., of the fourteen district court cases that
awarded all litigation costs as an "appropriate" Rule 11
sanction, all fourteen were imposed against plaintiffs or
their counsel, and eight of the fourteen involved civil rights
claims.'
5 7
Rule 1 I's impact on the legal community, however, is not
limited to the federal courts' decided cases, because: (a) most Rule
11 activity is not reported; 58 and (b) a lot of Rule 11 activity is
informal, taking the form of threats or warnings by opposing counsel
and the federal district courts.' 59 Given that Rule 11 sanctions are
not imposed in the majority of cases in which Rule 11 is raised,
160
one can only conclude that the threat of Rule 11 sanctions has had
the biggest impact on litigant behavior in the federal courts. Indeed,
Judge Sam Johnson has warned that "[t]he threat of the imposition of
large awards of attorneys' fees.., effectively closes the courts" to
people who advance "novel or controversial positions[,]" and "good
faith arguments to change existing law."'
16
We also know that prior exposure to some kind of Rule 11
activity will actually cause lawyers to change the way they counsel
their clients. According to the study conducted by the American
Judicature Society (AJS) of federal litigators in the Fifth, Seventh
157. Id. at 100-02 (footnotes omitted).
158. See supra note 94.
159. For example, Professor Vairo writes:
[A] great deal of anecdotal evidence exists that a large number of
judges, including those who previously were less zealous in prodding
the parties before them, cite Rule 11 in pretrial conferences and other
proceedings on and off the record to remind litigants of their
obligations under Rule 11, and that monetary consequences could
follow violations of the rule.
Vairo, Profession, supra note 5, at 624 (footnote omitted); see also, Elizabeth
C. Wiggins, et al., The Federal Judicial Center's Study of Rule 11, 2 F.J.C.
DIRECTIONS 3, 36, Nov. 19, 1991 (discussing the Federal Judicial Center's
["FJC"] study) (Two federal district court judges responding to the FJC survey
said, "I think the existence of Rule 11, not its use, has helped[,]" and "I have
found the rule most useful as a threat and have not, therefore, had to impose
sanctions very frequently.") (emphasis added).
160. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 10, at 952; see also Hart, Still Chilling,
supra note 3, at 102-03 (Author's research revealed that sanctions were
awarded in 49% of the 135 cases collected.).
161. Johnson, supra note 72, at 650 (emphasis added).
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and Ninth Circuits: 1
62
[L]awyers who had previously been exposed to some
degree of Rule 11 activity-ranging from having been
involved in a case in which sanctions were imposed to cases
involving out-of-court threats-were more likely to report
having changed their behavior in counselling [sic] clients
and litigating federal lawsuits primarily because of Rule
11 .... Specific deterrence appears to be occurring, as
lawyers who are directly exposed to a Rule 11 sanctions
experience seem to be more likely to change their behavior
than those [who] do not have personal experience with the
Rule.'
63
If the AJS study is correct, and prior exposure to Rule 11 has the
greatest impact on lawyer behavior, the obvious question is: which
lawyers have the highest exposure rate to some kind of Rule 11
activity, whether it be in decided cases or merely through threats?
The answer is that Rule 11 statistics and studies show that civil rights
plaintiffs filing lawsuits in the federal courts are targeted (which
includes being threatened with) and sanctioned under Rule 11 more
frequently than any other litigant in any other category of case.
164
Consequently, because: (a) this category of litigant is exposed to the
highest level of Rule 11 activity; and (b) we know that any prior
exposure to Rule 11 is most likely to result in changes in behavior,
this category of litigant and claim is much more likely to be chilled
by Rule 11.165 That is, civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys, more
than any other category of litigant, are less likely to: assert claims or
defenses that they believe have merit; file papers that they would like
162. Marshall, supra note 10, at 949-50.
163. Id. at 980-81.
164. Plaintiffs will be targeted for Rule 11 sanctions more frequently than
defendants. See Wiggins, supra note 159, at 19 (discussing the FJC study);
Marshall, supra note 10, at 952-53 (discussing the AJS study). Plaintiffs will
be sanctioned much more frequently than defendants. Wiggins, supra note
159, at 19 (the FJC study). And Rule 11 sanctions will actually be imposed
against civil rights plaintiffs and their attorneys at a rate significantly higher
than other litigants, plaintiff or defendant, in other cases. Tobias, Litigation,
supra note 14, at 490-91 (citing early studies conducted by Professor Nelken
and Professor Vairo); Marshall, supra note 10, at 965-66, 971 (the AJS study);
Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at 109-10.
165. See generally Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, Part IV.A (discussing
Rule I l's chilling effects on civil rights plaintiffs after the 1993 amendments).
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to file in a given case; and file lawsuits in the federal courts. 166 The
result, of course, is that development of the common law is stifled
and access to the federal courts for civil rights plaintiffs asserting
claims that challenge the existing status quo is discouraged.
167
The research conducted for this paper suggests that the practice
of "sidestepping" Rule 11 described above' 68 sometimes results in 28
U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power to sanction being used
as Rule 11 substitutes.169 Under these circumstances, therefore, the
federal court experience and conclusions regarding federal civil
rights plaintiffs and Rule 11 arguably still apply to sanctions requests
and awards imposed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and/or the court's
inherent power. 1
70
166. More specifically, the authors of the AJS study found that:
[R]espondents who identified themselves as spending more than 50%
of their time doing civil rights plaintiffs' work were far more likely to
be affected by Rule 11 than other lawyers in virtually every response
category that was measured. For example, 44% of the self-identified
civil rights plaintiffs' lawyers reported that they had advised a client
not to pursue a lawsuit that had little or no merit, compared to 13.2%
of those who spend most of their time on civil rights defense work.
That this disparity is not attributable purely to the plaintiff orientation
of this specific question can be seen by looking at the response rates to
the question of whether the lawyer decided not to assert a claim or
defense that the lawyer felt had potential merit. This question is not
particularly plaintiff-oriented, yet 31% of civil rights plaintiffs'
lawyers reported having taken this action, compared to 17.9% of those
who do civil rights work on the defense side. Similarly, 24% of civil
rights plaintiffs' lawyers reported that they had not filed particular
papers in a given case that they would have liked to file, compared to
10% of those doing civil rights defense work.
Marshall, supra note 10, at 971 (footnotes omitted).
167. See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 10, at 282-83; Eric K. Yamamoto,
Efficiency's Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 341, 345 (1990) [hereinafter Yamamoto, Efficiency's
Threat]. To the extent that Rule 11 prevents meritless claims from being filed
in the federal district courts, it is achieving salutary results. The objection
being levied here is that Rule 11 also chills civil rights plaintiffs and their
attorneys from filing meritorious claims.
168. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 147-49.
170. Again, the claim being made here is not that all of the increased
reliance on alternative bases of sanctions, like 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's
inherent power, is a result of the practice of sidestepping Rule I I's procedural
requirements. The claim is being made, however, that some of the shifting
emphasis under Rule 11 vis-a-vis 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent
676
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Consequently, for all of the reasons discussed above,
171
plaintiffs and their attorneys who bring civil rights claims in the
federal district courts are more likely than any other category of
litigant in any other type of case to be chilled by the zero sum
sanctions game that appears to be taking place in the federal district
courts. 172 This conclusion would hold true even if, as it turns out,
§ 1927 and/or inherent power sanctions are denied by the federal
district courts a majority of the time. 173 This is true because Rule 11
experience makes clear that the mere threat that § 1927 or inherent
power sanctions may be imposed, whether raised by the opposing
party or the federal district court, can produce profound chilling
effects.
174
power is a result of sidestepping. Consequently, to the extent that sidestepping
results in § 1927 or the court's inherent power being used as Rule 11
substitutes, it seems safe to conclude that these alternative bases of sanctions
would be subject to the same problems and criticisms plaguing Rule 11.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 150-67.
172. Figuring out the number of times sanctions are actually awarded
pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and/or the court's inherent power is
important because of the impact that decisions to impose sanctions have on the
legal community. See supra text accompanying notes 150-57. But the
significance of the fact that sanctions pursuant to these alternative bases of
authority are being threatened cannot be overlooked given the impact that
informal sanctioning activity, like threats to sanction, has on litigant behavior.
See supra text accompanying notes 158-64. In other words, the mere threat
that § 1927 or inherent power sanctions may be imposed, whether raised by the
opposing party or the court, can produce profound chilling effects.
173. Of course, sanctions pursuant to § 1927 and/or the court's inherent
power are sometimes awarded. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S.
32, 35, 40 (1991) (affirming federal district court's order imposing
$996,644.65 [representing all of the prevailing party's litigation expenses] as
inherent power sanctions); Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 297-99
(6th Cir. 1997) (reversing a federal magistrate's order imposing $32,546.02 as
Rule 11 sanctions, but affirming the magistrate's order imposing $32,546.02 as
§ 1927 sanctions). But determining the number of times sanctions are actually
awarded pursuant to either 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and/or the court's inherent power
is beyond the scope of this article.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 158-64 (discussing impact of
informal sanctioning activity).
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V. SOME THINGS TO THINK ABOUT
A. Is Sidestepping Improper?
Given that the same set of facts could trigger sanctions under
Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's inherent power, 175 the
question must be asked whether using § 1927 and/or the court's
inherent power to circumvent Rule I1 's procedural requirements is
actually improper? Both § 1927 and the court's inherent power to
sanction predate the enactment of Rule 11.176 Indeed, Rule 11 was
amended in 1993 after the United States Supreme Court decided the
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 177 case (discussed below), which appears
to give the federal district courts extremely broad discretion to
invoke their inherent power to sanction. In fact, the Advisory
Committee was not only aware that Chambers and § 1927 existed
when it amended Rule 11, but also made a point to state explicitly
that Rule 11 did not displace other sanctioning authority of the
federal district courts. 7 8 So is sidestepping improper? The
Chambers case suggests that the answer is no.
175. For example, defendant files a motion for summary judgment, which is
denied by the federal district court. Defendant files a motion for
reconsideration of the court's denial of its motion, even though the defendant
does not have any new evidence to present or arguments to make. Defendant
filed its motion to draw out the litigation in terms of time and expense, hoping
that plaintiff would then be forced to drop the lawsuit. Under these facts,
defendant's motion for reconsideration would trigger all three sanctioning
provisions. Rule 11 would be triggered because there was no reasonable basis
in fact or law for the filing and the motion was filed for an improper purpose.
§ 1927 would be triggered because the motion multiplied the litigation both
unreasonably and vexatiously. The court's inherent power would be triggered,
because the motion appeared to be filed in bad faith. See also supra note 141.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 9, 25, 44.
177. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
178. The Advisory Committee stated:
Rule 11 is not the exclusive source for control of improper
presentations of claims, defenses, or contentions. It does not supplant
statutes permitting awards of attorney's fees to prevailing parties or
alter the principles governing such awards. It does not inhibit the court
in punishing for contempt, in exercising its inherent powers, or in
imposing sanctions, awarding expenses, or directing remedial action
authorized under other rules or under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment (citation
omitted).
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1. Express authority-Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 1
79
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. 18 0 involved an $18 million contract
for the sale of G. Russell Chambers' Louisiana-based television and
radio communication business.' 81  Soon after the contract was
executed, Chambers decided that he no longer wanted to sell his
company. 182 NASCO, Inc. ("NASCO") filed suit in federal court in
the Western District of Louisiana seeking specific performance of
the contract and a temporary restraining order to prevent the
alienation or encumbrance of the properties at issue.'83 Chambers
and his attorneys then engaged in a wide variety of litigation
misconduct, including: refusing to allow NASCO to inspect business
documents pursuant to an injunction; trying to fraudulently deprive
the district court of jurisdiction by transferring the property to a third
party and then seeking refuge in the public records doctrine; Is4 filing
two appeals for relief of a contempt order, both of which were
dismissed for lack of a final judgment; 8 5 filing frivolous motions
and pleadings; 186 and engaging in tactics of delay, oppression, and
harassment, including attempting to start a new communications
company in Louisiana with FCC approval using the same equipment
purportedly sold to NASCO, pursuant to the parties' contract.
187
The district court ultimately determined that NASCO was
entitled to specific performance of the contract. 188 After the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision on the merits in favor of
NASCO, it sanctioned Chambers for filing a frivolous appeal, and
remanded the case to the district court to fix the amount of appellate
sanctions and determine whether further sanctions were warranted
for conduct that occurred during the litigation below.
189
On remand to the district court, NASCO moved for sanctions
against Chambers and his attorneys pursuant to Rule 11, 28 U.S.C.
179. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 35-36.
182. Id. at 36.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 36-37.
185. Id. at 38.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 39-40.
188. Id. at39.
189. Id. at 40.
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§ 1927, and the court's inherent power.' 90 "After full briefing and a
hearing," the district court imposed sanctions against Chambers in
the form of attorneys' fees and costs totaling $996,644.64, which
represented all of NASCO's fees and costs incurred in the
litigation. 191 Several of Chambers' attorneys were also disbarred or
suspended from practice. 192 Despite the fact that Rule 11 and 28
U.S.C. § 1927 were available, at least with respect to portions of the
litigation misconduct, the district court imposed all of the sanctions
pursuant to its inherent power. The district court relied solely on its
inherent power to sanction, after concluding that neither Rule 11 nor
§ 1927 were broad enough to encompass all of the litigation
misconduct at issue. 193 The Fifth Circuit affirmed. 194
In a five-to-four decision written by Justice White, the United
States Supreme Court also affirmed, finding no abuse of discretion
by the federal district court in relying solely on its inherent power to
sanction.1 95 In affirming, the Supreme Court stated:
[A] federal court [is not] forbidden to sanction bad-faith
conduct by means of the inherent power simply because
that conduct could also be sanctioned under the statute [i.e.,
§" 1927] or the Rules [of Civil Procedure] .... [I]f in the
informed discretion of the [district] court, neither the statute
nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on
its inherent power.'
96
In other words, the Supreme Court essentially held:
When express Rules and statutes provided by Congress do
not reach the entirety of a litigant's bad-faith conduct,
including conduct occurring before litigation commenced, a
district court may disregard the requirements of otherwise
applicable Rules and statutes and instead exercise inherent




192. Id. at 41 n.5.
193. Id. at41-42.
194. Id. at42.
195. Id. at 50.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 63 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also Fehderau, supra note 48, at
708 ("[W]henever conduct sanctionable under Rule 11 is intertwined with
conduct that only the inherent power could address, a court in its discretion
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Unfortunately, Chambers has been interpreted by some
commentators and courts as essentially encouraging, if not explicitly
authorizing, federal district courts to sidestep Rule 11 (and other
express sanctioning provisions) in favor of its inherent power. 198
2. It is improper to use § 1927 or the court's inherent power to
sanction to sidestep Rule 11
An extremely pertinent question, Chambers notwithstanding, is
why are all three sanctioning provisions even necessary, if 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 or the court's inherent power to sanction can simply be used
to circumvent Rule l I's procedural requirements anytime those
requirements are not satisfied? The existence of all three sanctioning
provisions must mean one of two things: either the sanctioning
authorities are different, in which case sidestepping is improper, or
one or more of the sanctioning provisions is superfluous. Since I am
not prepared at this point to think the latter, I have to conclude that
the provisions are at least different enough to be distinguishable on a
given set of facts. If I am wrong on this score, and I am perfectly
willing to be convinced, then further discussions should probably
take place about the future of Rule 11.199
a. it is improper to use § 1927 and the court's inherent power to
sidestep Rule 11 where the specific requirements for triggering
these other sanctioning provisions are not met
The fact of the matter is, even though Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927
and the court's inherent power do overlap, 20 0 the three sanctioning
provisions also differ in many important respects. For example,20 '
Rule 11 only applies to pleadings, written motions, and other papers
may safely rely on its inherent power alone."); Baker, supra note 48, at 196-
97.
198. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 48, at 196-97; Jerold S. Solovy, Sanctions
Under Rule 11, in CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE
2003 235, 242 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
HOOKT, 2003), WL 691 PLI/Lit 235. Professor Baker also notes that "[t]en of
the thirteen federal appellate courts have applied the Chambers rationale to
affirm or uphold sanctions .... ." Id. at 203. See also supra, text accompanying
note 139 (discussing the Flanagan case out of the Ninth Circuit).
199. These discussions could include asking whether Rule 11 needs to be
amended further, or even repealed.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 40, 63-64.
201. The examples provided in the text are by no means exhaustive.
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filed in civil actions in the federal district courts. 2 0 2 Both § 1927 and
the court's inherent power, however, may be imposed for a wide
range of litigation misconduct occurring in any civil or criminal
proceeding in either the federal district or appellate courts.
20 3
Who can be sanctioned also depends on the sanctioning
provision being used. Sanctions under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, for
example, may only be imposed on attorneys; it does not apply to
clients or pro se litigants. 204 Sanctions under both Rule 11 and the
court's inherent power, in contrast, can be imposed against attorneys
and their law firms, the parties, and pro se litigants.20 1 Rule 11
sanctions against a represented party, however, are limited in one
significant way. Specifically, monetary sanctions may not be
imposed on a represented party for violations regarding existing law
or "nonfrivolous argument[s] for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law[.]
206
While due process must be satisfied before sanctions can be
imposed under Rule 11, § 1927, or the court's inherent power,20 7 that
is probably where the procedural similarity ends. The three
sanctioning provisions vary greatly in the procedural limits
applicable to each. For example, under Rule 11:
[A] district court [may] impose reasonable sanctions,
including attorney's fees, when a party or attorney violates
the certification standards that attach to the signing of
certain legal papers. A district court [may] issue sanctions
under Rule 11 when particular individuals (signers) file
certain types (groundless, unwarranted, vexatious) of
documents (pleadings, [written] motions and papers). Rule
Il 's certification requirements apply to all signers of
documents, including represented parties... , and the Rule
202. See JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 5(A) at 69.
203. See id., § 21(A)(1), at 375, § 21(B), at 378 (§ 1927), § 26(B), at 431, §
26(D), at 435 (inherent power).
204. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1980) (title of section is: "Counsel's liability for
excessive costs."); JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 21(C)(1), at 379.
205. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c); JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, §
26(C)(1), at 431-32 (discussing the court's inherent power).
206. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (b)(2) & (c)(2)(A).
207. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c) and advisory committee's note to 1993
amendment; JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 25(B), at 417 (§ 1927) §
29(A), at 462 (inherent power).
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does not aply to papers filed in fora other than district
courts ....
In contrast, "courts [may] apply inherent powers without
specific definitional or procedural limits."
20 9
Perhaps even more significant than the technical differences
between the sanctioning provisions, and as previously discussed,
Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power to sanction
serve different purposes;2 10 they exist to address different problems
faced by the federal courts;211 the scope of § 1927 and the court's
inherent power are much broader than that of Rule 11;212 and the
type of misconduct necessary to trigger sanctions under each of these
provisions differ.213
So, yes, the same litigation misconduct could trigger all three
sanctioning provisions.2 14  But, assuming the same litigation
misconduct is being used as a basis for seeking sanctions pursuant to
all three sanctioning authorities,215 the bottom line remains the same.
If the misconduct at issue fails to satisfy the specific triggering
mechanism for § 1927 or the court's inherent power2 16 and imposing
sanctions would not address the specific problem that § 1927 or the
208. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 67-68 (1991) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (citation omitted); see also supra text accompanying notes 72-81
(discussing the 1993 procedural amendments to Rule 11).
209. Id. at 68.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 12, 17, 26, 28-29, 48-49.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 11, 28-31, 46-47, 49-50.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 19-23, 38-39, 54-60.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 23, 32-34, 52.
214. See supra note 175.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 98-137 (discussing cases where the
same alleged misconduct was used to trigger sanctions under Rule 11, § 1927
or the court's inherent power). It also seems clear that different conduct in the
same case could trigger different sanctioning provisions. This scenario,
however, is not the one implicated when § 1927 and the court's inherent power
are invoked to sidestep Rule I l's procedural requirements.
216. Specifically, to trigger: (a) Rule 11 sanctions, a pleading, written or
other paper must be filed or presented to the court in violation of the Rule's
certification requirements; see supra text accompanying notes 19-22; (b)
§ 1927 sanctions, the misconduct at issue must multiply the proceedings both
vexatiously and unreasonably; the federal district court should be looking for a
dilatory course of conduct, rather than a single defective paper. See supra text
accompanying notes 26, 32-34; and (c) inherent power sanctions, the
misconduct at issue must have been undertaken in bad faith. See supra text
accompanying note 52.
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court's inherent power is intended to address, 21 7 then it would seem
that the federal district courts simply cannot impose sanctions
pursuant to those provisions. In other words, under the
circumstances just described, it would be improper, based on the
language and purpose of the sanctioning authorities themselves, to
invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the court's inherent power to sanction to
sidestep Rule 11 's procedural requirements.
b. sidestepping should be improper as a matter ofpolicy
Separate and apart from whether the three sanctioning
provisions can be interpreted in a way that prevents any of them from
being redundant, or worse, superfluous,. there are strong policy
arguments that using 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the court's inherent power
to sanction to sidestep Rule lI's procedural requirements should be
improper. It should be improper because any other interpretation
will likely produce several pernicious effects, some of which have
already been discussed in some detail . 18
To begin with, allowing § 1927 and the court's inherent power
to be used as Rule 11 substitutes runs the risk of eviscerating the
1993 amendments to Rule 11 by essentially reading them out of the
Rule.219  Such an interpretation will also promote a lack of
uniformity in Rule 11 decisions because the same litigation
misconduct may or may not trigger Rule 11, depending on whether
the Rule's procedural requirements have been met. Lack of
uniformity, in turn, will only serve to increase Rule 11 's chilling
effects220 because federal court litigants and their attorneys will once
217. Rule 11 is designed to deter frivolous litigation, see supra text
accompanying note 12; § 1927 is designed to deter unnecessary delay in
litigation and control abuses of the judicial process, see supra text
accompanying notes 28-30; and the court's inherent power is designed to
preserve the authority and dignity of the federal courts by preventing
disruption or abuse of judicial processes and ensuring obedience to a court's
orders. See supra text accompanying note 47.
218. See Part IV, supra.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 145-49; see also Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 67 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("By inviting
district courts to rely on inherent authority as a substitute for attention to the
careful distinctions contained in the Rules ... , today's decision will render
these sources of authority superfluous in many instances.").
220. Recall that lack of uniformity is cited as one of the causes of Rule lI's
chilling effects. See supra text accompanying note 70.
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again be unsure as to when and if Rule 11, as opposed to § 1927 or
the court's inherent power, will be invoked against them.221 And
because they will not be able to adequately predict what might
trigger Rule 11,222 federal court litigants, especially civil rights
plaintiffs who are typically resource poor, 22 3 may decide that they
cannot afford to file unpopular but meritorious claims in federal
224court. Surely this cannot be the result intended by the Advisory
225 226Committee,225 Congress or the federal courts.
c. but what about Chambers?
The Chambers227 case can be interpreted as holding that Rule 11
can be "sidestepped" in favor of the court's inherent power. 228 But
Chambers does not compel such a result, nor should it be so
interpreted.229
221. As Justice Kennedy wrote in his dissenting opinion in Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991), Rule I l's "definite standards give litigants
notice of the proscribed conduct and make possible meaningful review for
misuse of discretion...." Id. at 68 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); c.f Fehderau,
supra note 48, at 725 ("By passing over Rule 11 and invoking the court's
inherent power, judges fimdamentally alter norms against which litigants are
measured.").
222. For that matter, federal court litigants, including civil rights plaintiffs,
will probably not be able to accurately predict when and if sanctions will be
triggered under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power, either.
223. See Tobias, Revision, supra note 67 at 192 (arguing that, "the intrinsic
nature of considerable civil rights litigation and the restraints which impede
many civil rights plaintiffs and practitioners may make their efforts to comply
with Rule lI 's strictures covering prefiling inquiries and legal and factual
certification seem inadequate. These inherent characteristics, particularly the
parties' and attorneys' lack of money, time, power, and access to information
involving their cases, also explain why these litigants and their counsel may be
risk averse and why Rule I I's invocation might chill their efforts.") (footnotes
omitted).
224. See Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at 35.
225. See supra Part II.B (discussing reasons why the Advisory Committee
decided to substantially amend Rule 11 for the second time in 1993).
226. Congress is implicated here for the simple reason that it was responsible
for enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Congress, therefore, would have an interest in
how § 1927 is being interpreted by the federal courts.
227. 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
228. See supra Part V.A.1.
229. For very good critiques of the majority opinion in Chambers, see
generally, Pushaw, supra note 47; see also Chambers, 501 U.S. at 60
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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First, Chambers can and should be interpreted as requiring the
federal district courts to invoke rules-based (or statutory) sanctions
powers, if those rules are adequate to cover the misconduct at
issue.230 The case can be interpreted in this fashion, because the
Chambers' majority itself expressly stated that, "when there is bad-
faith conduct in the course of litigation that could be adequately
sanctioned under the Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the
Rules rather than the inherent power."231 In these circumstances, that
is, where there is a rule or statute that is adequate to the task, there is
simply no need to resort to the court's inherent power, and
Chambers, therefore, should be so construed.232  In fact, several
federal circuit courts have already done so.
For example, in United States v. One 1987 BMW 325,233 the
First Circuit reversed a district court order striking a claim for failure
to make discovery where the opposing party failed to make a motion
to compel discovery, as required by Rule 37, before seeking
dismissal.234 The First Circuit stated:
[T]here are limits to a court's inherent powers, particularly
in instances where the Civil Rules are on all fours. When,
as in this case, the Civil Rules limit the nature of the
sanction that can be imposed, a court may not use its
inherent powers to circumvent the Rules' specific
provisions.
235
In another example, the Seventh Circuit reversed a district court
order that reversed a decision of the bankruptcy court and awarded
judgment in favor of one of the parties for failure of the opposing
party's counsel to file an appearance form, pursuant to a local rule of
court.236 The district court relied on Rule 11 and another local rule
as authority for its action.2 " In reversing the district court, the
Seventh Circuit stated:
230. See JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 26(A)(1), at 428; Fehderau,
supra note 48, at 718-19.
231. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50.
232. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, § 26(A)(1), at 428; Fehderau, supra
note 48, at 719.
233. 985 F.2d 655 (1st Cir. 1993).
234. Id. at 661.
235. Id. (citations omitted).
236. Kovilic Constr. Co. v. Missbrenner, 106 F.3d 768, 771 (7th Cir. 1997).
237. Id.
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[The inherent power] exists even where procedural rules
govern the same conduct. Nevertheless, "[b]ecause of their
very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with
restraint and discretion." Furthermore, courts may not
exercise their inherent powers in a way that actually
conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions. The
'supersession' clause of the Rules Enabling Act...
suggests that exercises of inherent powers may also not
directly conflict with the national procedural rules. This
Court has recognized the need to be cautious when
resorting to inherent powers to justify an action, particularly
when the matter is governed by other procedural rules, lest
(even in the absence of a direct conflict) the restrictions in
those rules become meaningless.
238
In addition, Chambers should not dictate the result in a case
where Chambers can be distinguished factually.239 Recall that in
Chambers, the sanctioned litigant and his attorneys engaged in
"extraordinary, persistent abusive behavior, not all of which was
sanctionable under existing statutes and rules." 24°  Under these
circumstances, where "the conduct sanctionable under the Rules [is]
intertwined within conduct that only the inherent power [can]
address[,] ' '241 the Chambers majority held that the federal district
courts have discretion to invoke their inherent power to sanction.
24 2
Stated alternatively, if the litigation misconduct at issue does fall
squarely within the scope of a Rule (or statute), then Chambers is
distinguishable and the federal district courts: (a) should not rely on
their inherent powers to impose a sanction; and instead (b) should
rely on the Rule implicated on the facts to govern their sanctions
238. Id. at 772-73 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see also
Runfola & Assoc., Inc. v. Spectrum Reporting II, Inc., 88 F.3d 368, 375 (6th
Cir. 1996); but see supra note 198 (noting that several federal circuit courts
have relied on Chambers to uphold inherent power sanctions).
239. See generally Fehderau, supra note 48, at 728-30 (noting that litigants
facing sanctions have several courses of action available after Chambers). A
"Keycite" of the Chambers case on Westlaw reveals all of the negative indirect
history for the case, including cases in which Chambers was distinguished.
240. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS, supra note 18, at § 26(A)(1) at 428; Johnson,
supra note 72, at 653; see also Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50-51
(1991).
241. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 51.
242. Id. at 50.
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decision.243
B. What's at Stake?
This article has essentially assumed that civil rights litigation is
important and that the federal courts are an important forum for these
kinds of "conversations" to take place. Are these assumptions
correct? Is access to the federal courts important for civil rights
plaintiffs? My unqualified answer is yes. Elsewhere I have written:
Access to court is critical for litigants asserting non-
mainstream claims that challenge the existing socio-
political order. It is critical for two very related reasons:
first, because minority groups are typically outside of the
political decision making process and, as a result, subject to
the will of the majority, and, second, because of the integral
part courts play in our constitutional system and democratic
form of government. More specifically, under a separation
of powers ideal, courts operate to prevent oppression of
minorities by the majority; they function, at least in part, to
hold government accountable by constitutional standards;
and they are an important forum in which public values and
group rights can be discussed, renegotiated, and
vindicated.24
Civil rights litigation, in turn, is extremely important because it
serves to build our communities;245 it educates and informs the
243. My colleague, Michael Dorff, suggests that rather than trying to
distinguish Chambers, the wiser course, strategically, might be to advocate that
Chambers be overruled, either by the Supreme Court or by statute. In other
words, if one of the reasons Rule 11 was amended in 1993 was to reduce its
chilling effects, thereby helping to preserve access to the federal courts for
civil rights plaintiffs, then either the Supreme Court or Congress should act to
prevent that purpose from being thwarted by the federal courts' interpretation
and application of § 1927 and/or the court's inherent power to sanction. I
certainly have no objections to the strategy suggested by Professor Dorff; but,
like him, I am also under no illusions about whether such action will be taken
anytime soon by our current Supreme Court and Congress.
244. Hart, Still Chilling, supra note 3, at 139-41 (footnotes omitted).
245. There are different ways to define the "community" being built.
Compare Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96
YALE L.J. 1860, 1874-75 (1987) [hereinafter Minow, Interpreting Rights]
("Although the language of rights, on its surface, speaks little of community or
convention, those who exercise rights signal and strengthen their relation to a
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public246 about non-mainstream claims and perspectives 247 and the
differences among us. 248  Importantly, civil rights litigation also
conveys a powerful political message about the kind of society in
which we want to be a part.249 For all of these reasons, then, access
to our courts is absolutely essential, and the federal district court's
sanctioning powers, whether under Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 or the
court's inherent powers, should not be used to impede it.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Rule 11 was significantly amended in 1993 to help reduce,
among other things, the Rule's chilling effects on federal civil rights
plaintiffs. The 1993 amendments have been in effect for ten years
now, more than enough time to draw at least some preliminary
conclusions regarding whether those amendments have been
successful.
Preliminary research seems to suggest that the federal district
courts and the litigants practicing before them appear to be invoking
28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power to sanction
specifically to circumvent the procedural requirements added to Rule
11 in 1993. This suggestion is troubling because it means that §
community... Stating a claim in a form devised by those who are powerful in
the community expresses a willingness to take part in the community, as well
as a tactical decision to play by the rules of the only game recognized by those
in charge."), with Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 167, at 405 ("A
developing view of minority litigation is that the process of asserting rights...
creates context for sharing common struggles. It links 'the individual to a
broader social group,' providing strength from a collective identity."); and
Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic Of Rights And Politics: Perspectives
From The Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589, 612-13 (1986).. These
different conceptions of community are not mutually exclusive; they are both
very much at work when a minority group asserts a rights claim.
246. See generally,Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat, supra note 167 at 408
n.312 (describing ways in which minority perspectives are communicated to
the public through the legal process).
247. Id. at 407-08.
248. MARTHA MINow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 22, 50 (1990)
(arguing persuasively that "difference" is a comparative term, that is, different
as to whom? Significantly, this point of comparison often goes unstated).
249. Schneider, supra note 245 at 624-25; Yamamoto, Efficiency's Threat,
supra note 167 at 420-21; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073, 1089 (1984); Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 245 at 1867;
Danielle Kie Hart, Same-Sex Marriage Revisited: Taking A Critical Look At
Baehr v. Lewin, 9 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 1, 110-11 (1998).
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1927 and the court's inherent power are essentially being used as
Rule 11 substitutes. If these alternative bases of sanctions are indeed
being used as Rule 11 substitutes, then, it seems inescapable that
many, if not all, of the criticisms that prompted the 1993 revisions to
Rule 11 would apply now to § 1927 and the court's inherent power
to sanction as well. Such a result would not bode well for any
federal court litigant; it would be particularly chilling, however, for
federal civil rights plaintiffs.
So, are the amendments working? Are they accomplishing the
purposes envisioned for them by the Advisory Committee? To
answer these questions definitively, more than the anecdotal research
conducted here needs to be done. My hope, though, is that this
article will prompt further discussions about the sanctioning power
of the federal courts in general and Rule 11 in particular. In the end,
I remain confident that the problems suggested here can be remedied
if the federal bench and bar adopt a careful and cautious approach to
sanctions.
